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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Curtis B. Campbell was a defendant in a separate
action brought by Robert Slusher and the estate of Todd Paul
Ospital, who are not parties to the present litigation. The prior
action was fully resolved in the case of Slusher v. Ospital, 777
P.2d 437 (Utah 1989). All other parties to the proceedings are set
forth in the caption on appeal.
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This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in ruling that payment of an
excess judgment relieves an insurer of liability for other damages
arising out of prior wrongful conduct toward its insured?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's conclusion of law is
reviewed by this Court for correctness. L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol
Life Insurance Company. 765 P. 2d 857 (Utah 1988). In reviewing the
grant of summary judgment, this Court must view all facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to appellants. Reeves v.
Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah App. 1988).
2. Did the district court err in ignoring the Campbells'
other causes of action in granting summary judgment on the entire
complaint?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's conclusion of law is
reviewed for correctness. L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol Life
Insurance Company. 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988).
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying
the Campbells sufficient opportunity to fully perform discovery?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's ruling on the
Campbells' motion for continuance is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah,
561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977).
STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance
to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order
as is just.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
This case involves claims for special, general and punitive
damages based upon the legal theories of (1) breach of the covenant
of good faith, (2) tort of bad faith, (3) breach of fiduciary duty,
(4) fraudulent misrepresentation, and (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
The Campbells were insured under an automobile insurance
policy issued by State Farm which had liability limits of $50,000
per accident. After a serious auto accident, two lawsuits were
filed against Curtis Campbell for personal injury and wrongful
death, with claims far in excess of the policy limit. Despite
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numerous offers by the injured parties to settle within the policy
limits, State Farm refused to offer any amount. At trial of these
lawsuits in September 1983, the jury assessed 100 percent of fault
for the accident on Campbell, resulting in a verdict against
Campbell in the amount of approximately $250,000. On appeal, this
court upheld the verdict against the Campbells. Slusher v.
Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989). The Campbells subsequently
instituted this action against State Farm.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision on January 15,
1991 (see Addendum, Exhibit A) and granted summary judgment on
February 11, 1991. (R-583-84, see Addendum, Exhibit B). A notice
of appeal was filed March 8, 1991. (R. 598).
Statement of Facts
The following facts and evidence were presented to the
district court, and were either uncontroverted or assumed true:
Curtis Campbell, an insured of State Farm, was involved in an
accident on May 22, 1981. After the accident, State Farm assigned
one of its adjusters, Ray Summers, to investigate and evaluate the
claim. Soon after his initial investigation. Summers reached the
conclusion that the insured Curtis Campbell was at least partly at
fault for the accident and there was exposure under the policy.
Further, due to the substantial injuries and death, Summers
concluded there would likely be personal exposure to Mr. Campbell
if the matter was not settled within the policy limits. (R. 287,
Paras. 4, 6-7).
Summers prepared a report of his investigation and evaluation
and submitted the same to his supervisors. Upon receipt of this
report, he was directed by one of his supervisors to destroy the
portion of the report which related to fault on the part of Mr.
Campbel1, and to rewrite the report with no fault or liability
assessed to Mr. Campbell. Though Mr. Summers believed that this
position seriously jeopardized Mr. Campbell, he followed the
directions of his supervisor out of fear for his job. Mr. Summers
believed that State Farm's position of no liability was unfair,
inconsistent with the facts, and breached the duties owed by an
insurer to its insured. (R. 287-88, Para. 5).
The eye witnesses to the accident implicated Mr. Campbell as
the precipitating cause of the accident. (R. 288, Para. 6).
On numerous occasions, the attorneys for the injured parties,
Ospital and Slusher, made demand before and during trial that State
Farm pay its policy limits of $25,000 to each claimant. Ospital
even indicated a willingness to accept an offer of less than the
$25,000 policy limit if it would avoid a trial; however. State Farm
never offered any amount to any claimant until after the jury
verdict. (R. 218, Para. 3 and Exhibits A, C, D, E, F, J, L and M.)
At trial, in September 1983, the jury found Campbell 100
percent responsible for the accident, resulting in a verdict of
approximately $250,000 against him, less an offset of $6 5,0 00.
Following the verdict, the trial court stated:
This Court agrees with the jury findings and would have
so found had there not been a jury. The only
disagreement the Court would have had if he himself [had]
participated in the jury results would be that the amount
of damages [was] too small.
(Quoted in Slusher, 777 P.2d at 445) (Court's brackets).
Within approximately two months following the jury verdict,
the two claimants (Slusher and Ospital) and the insured (Curtis
Campbell) all made demand upon State Farm to pay the full amount of
the judgments. On November 23, 1983, for the first time, State
Farm made an offer to the claimants to pay its policy limits of
$25,000 each, however, State Farm refused to pay any amount of the
excess judgment. (R. 218, Para. 3, Exhibits G, H, I, J, K, L and
M) .
For nearly three years after the judgment was entered, State
Farm expressly refused to pay anything more than its policy limits.
Jerry L. Stevenson, Claims Superintendent for State Farm, stated in
a letter dated May 21, 1984, "...if the judgment entered in this
case is affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court and becomes final, State
Farm will pay our policy limits in partial satisfaction of that
judgment, together with interest on the entire judgment and costs."
(R. 218, Exhibit L.) State Farm did not give any indication it
might pay the excess judgment until 1986.
Prior to the trial, State Farm and its retained attorney
continued to represent to the Campbells that there was no evidence
to support liability on Mr. Campbell and therefore there was no
exposure to him. At trial, for the first time, the Campbells heard
the eyewitnesses that testified concerning Mr. Campbell's
involvement in the cause of the accident. In surprise, Campbell
asked the State Farm attorney about this adverse testimony and why
he had not heard about it before, and he was told not to worry,
that the attorney could take care of everything. It appeared to
Campbell that the evidence was strongly against him at the time of
trial, which evidence was withheld from him prior to that time.
(Depo. of Curtis Campbell, pp. 89-91, 104-106; Depo. of Inez
Campbell, pp. 8-9, 41, 43).
The attorney retained by State Farm expressly represented to
Mr. Campbell that he had no excess exposure, and there was plenty
of insurance to cover any risk. (Depo. of Curtis Campbell, pp. 90,
105) .
After the trial, Curtis Campbell immediately hired independent
counsel (Miles Jensen and Brent Hoggan) to represent him regarding
the excess exposure. These attorneys made demand upon State Farm
to pay the excess judgments, however, State Farm refused to do so.
Over a period of months, the Campbells provided information to
their attorneys concerning their assets and their personal ability
to pay the excess judgments. Approximately three months after the
trial, Campbells' attorneys arranged a meeting with the attorneys
for the claimants for the purpose of negotiating a settlement of
the excess judgments. No settlement was consummated until nearly
a year later, in December 1984. (Deposition of Curtis Campbell,
pp. 8, 14-16, 18, 32-36; R. 218, Exhibit G).
As a result of the excess judgments, the Campbells had to hire
attorneys and incurred attorney fees, for which they sought
recovery in the present action. The Campbells also had loss of
business and other miscellaneous out-of-pocket expenses. (Depo. of
Curtis Campbell, pp. 38, 86, and Exhibit 18).
The Campbells each suffered severe physical and emotional
problems which were either caused or seriously aggravated by the
extreme emotional upset from the excess judgments and the financial
insecurity relating thereto. These problems included depression,
high blood pressure, aggravation of Parkinson's Syndrome, suicidal
tendencies, loss of reputation, embarrassment and humiliation. The
Campbells have been treated by doctors for some of these problems.
(Depo. of Curtis Campbell, pp. 67-72, 75-80; Depo. of Inez
Campbell, pp. 8-10, 14-16, 19-23, 29, 32, 41, 43). After the
verdict was announced, the Campbells' own attorney (retained by
State Farm) stated that State Farm would not pay the excess
judgment, and suggested the Campbells put a "For Sale" sign on
their home:
Q: I have one question. After the jury verdict came
in on Monday evening, the 20th, do you recall what
discussions took place between you and Mr. Bennett
on the way to the airport? And if so, please
relate it.
A: He said, "I'm sure that State Farm will pay their
policy limits, but the rest of it is up to you."
(Depo. of Curtis Campbell, pp. 111-112).
A: How do you put those things in words? Have you
ever been through that situation where you watch a
husband anguish over it? Have you spent nights
sleepless because you're both wondering what's
going to happen? And after he told us we should
put a for sale sign on our place--
Q: MR. HUMPHERYS: You're referring to Mr. Bennett?
A: THE WITNESS: Yes. — that day he said — when
Curtis asked him, he said, "Well, what should I do?
What do you suggest I do now?" He said, "Put a for
sale sign on your place." Have you ever gone
through that and think, everything I've worked for
all of my life is going to just go up in smoke now,
and you see your husband anguish, you see yourself
or you know yourself you're sleepless, you're
nervous, you're totally upset, you lose faith in—I
really lost a lot of faith in human mankind. And
we spent a lot of anguished hours together.
(Depo. of Inez Campbell, pp. 14-15).
The Campbells retained an expert in the insurance industry,
Milton Q. Beck, who has more than 27 years' experience in insurance
adjusting, including supervisory and managerial responsibilities,
and has qualified on numerous occasions as an expert witness in
third-party claims. (R. 464-65.) Upon extensive review of the
evidence, Beck concluded that State Farm breached its duties to the
Campbells in several key respects:
State Farm failed to acknowledge and inform the Campbells of
the potential exposure they faced, and failed to inform Curtis
Campbell of the crucial fact that joint and several liability could
result in 100 percent exposure for damages even if he was only
partially at fault. Beck also concluded that, in light of State
Farm's low limits and the high potential damages, State Farm should
have tendered its limits upon demand. In his affidavit, Beck
testified that State Farm also should have recognized and informed
the Campbells of the inherent conflict of interest present when an
insurer-retained attorney defends an insured with likely excess
exposure. Beck concluded that State Farm withheld essential
information in its own interests, unnecessarily subjected its
insured to the emotional trauma of a trial and an excess judgment,
and improperly refused to pay the excess judgment immediately.
Such conduct was, in Beck's opinion, outrageous and beyond the
scope of conduct of any reasonable insurer. (R. 464-72.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court incorrectly ruled that payment of the
excess judgment relieves an insurer of all liability for its
earlier improper conduct. The Campbells are entitled to damages
for emotional and physical injury resulting from State Farm's
improper conduct. State Farm's deliberate disregard for the
Campbell's interests also warrants imposition of punitive damages.
The company's eventual payment of the excess judgment itself only
eliminates one element of the Campbell's damages, and does not
affect its liability for other damages.
The district court also erred in dismissing the other causes
of action set forth in the Campbell's complaint. The Campbells
alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The uncontroverted evidence
adduced below supported claims under each of those causes of
action. The district court's dismissal of the claims was premised
on faulty reasoning, and was unsupported under the law.
Finally, the district court abused its discretion in denying
the Campbells an opportunity to conduct additional discovery prior
to its ruling on the motion. The plaintiffs' counsel filed an
affidavit explaining that State Farm had resisted discovery, and
that plaintiffs' counsel had been seriously ill, impeding discovery
efforts. The affidavit set forth additional information which
would be obtained through discovery in support of the plaintiffs'
claims. The district court's refusal to permit the additional
discovery constituted an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
I. PAYMENT OF THE EXCESS JUDGMENT DOES NOT
RELIEVE STATE FARM OF LIABILITY FOR OTHER
DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF ITS PRIOR WRONGFUL
CONDUCT.
This action arises out of State Farm's refusal to settle a
third-party claim against its insured, Curtis Campbell, within
policy limits. As a result, excess judgments were entered against
Mr. Campbell amounting to nearly $200,000, after certain offsets.
In the lower court, State Farm moved for summary judgment
based upon the grounds that after approximately six years, it
eventually paid the excess judgments entered against Mr. Campbell.
Therefore, State Farm argued, the Campbells "were never exposed to
an excess judgment, and cannot maintain an action for bad faith."
The district court granted State Farm's motion. The court's ruling
was erroneous, however, for several reasons.
First, the evidence adduced below (viewed most favorably to
appellants) establishes that the Campbells were exposed to the
excess judgment and felt exposed. The Campbells' insurance with
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State Farm provided coverage only in the amount of $25,000 per
person/$50,000 per accident. Naturally, therefore, the Campbells
were devastated when the jury awarded $253,000 in damages against
them, particularly when the attorney retained to defend them by
State Farm subsequently told them they should consider putting a
"For Sale" sign on their home to take care of this excess judgment.
The district court disregarded the uncontroverted testimony on this
issue, however, and made several fact findings on which it relied
in rendering summary judgment. The court first found that Mr.
Campbell could not have been "so naive" that he did not realize the
jury could find him responsible for the accident. (R. 572).' The
court then concluded that Mr. Campbell "share[d] some of the
responsibility in the decision making process," and that therefore
"it would not be unreasonable for defendant not to settle the
claims . . . .» (R.572).
"In considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not
appropriate for a court to weigh the evidence or assess
credibility; the sole initial inquiry is whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact. Furthermore, it only takes one sworn
statement to dispute the averments on the other side of the
'The district court's comment seems ironic in light of the fact
that Campbell's own attorney assured him there was no chance of an
adverse verdict, an opinion apparently shared by State Farm, which
refused to offer any amount to the claimants.
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controversy and create such an issue." Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639-40
(citations omitted). In this case, the district court took it upon
itself to decide whether State Farm acted reasonably, which is the
ultimate issue to be decided by a jury. Such fact-finding was
improper in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The facts,
and reasonable inferences therefrom, were to be viewed in the light
most favorable to the Campbells. Id.
The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Campbells, establishes that the Campbells suffered physically and
emotionally from entry of the excess judgment. It was not until
approximately three months after the trial that any proposal was
submitted to the Campbells to the effect that something might be
worked out to postpone execution on the judgment. Even then, the
agreement was only that execution would be postponed to see if a
satisfactory arrangement could be reached. The uncontroverted
testimony of Curtis Campbell made clear his understanding that
execution on his assets would occur if no agreement could be
reached:
Q. You expected that if you were to assign your claim
for bad faith against State Farm to Slusher and
Ospital, that they in turn would agree not to try
to enforce collection of the judgment against you
from your personal assets?
A. Right, that's correct.
Q. In effect, they were going to give you a covenant
not to execute against your personal assets?
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A. I hoped to—I hoped that's what would come from it.
Q. And you knew those discussions were kind of ongoing
between the time you first talked to Mr. Hoggan
after the trial and Mr. Jensen and during the next
several months?
A. Yes.
Q. Did your lawyers inform you—when I say "your
lawyers" I'm talking about Hoggan and Jensen—that
they had reached any kind of a tentative agreement
with Mr. Humpherys and Mr. Barrett about that?
A. We met in their office with Mr. Humpherys and Mr.
Barrett. I can't recall the dates right now, but
it was about the end of '83.
Q. Okay.
A. And we discussed the pros and cons of being able to
develop such an agreement.
* * *
Q: And when you left that meeting did you feel that such an
agreement had been reached—
A: No.
(Depo. of Curtis Campbell, pp. 10-11) (Emphasis added).
No final agreement was executed until more than a year after
the judgment. Furthermore, the Campbells' undisputed testimony
reveals their fear that their property was at risk even after the
agreement was signed, due to: (1) their distrust of the courts and
attorneys, enhanced by the conduct of the attorney retained by
State Farm; (2) their experience that it was not uncommon for
agreements to be broken; and (3) if the appeal didn't turn out
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right, they still might be exposed. (Depo. of Curtis Campbell, pp.
10-11, 49-50, 53) .
State Farm's offer to pay the excess judgment plus interest
and costs did not come until February 1986, more than two years
after the excess judgment was entered. Moreover, this offer was
expressly conditioned upon the Campbells releasing all claims
against State Farm for their personal damages. (R.117.) The
Campbells were willing to accept this offer to settle the judgment
if their personal claims against State Farm were reserved, but
State Farm was unwilling to do so. State Farm's contention that
the Campbells were "never exposed to the excess judgment" is thus
contradicted by the uncontroverted evidence.
The district court's dismissal of the Campbells' bad faith
action is also erroneous for a second reason. Even though State
Farm eventually paid the excess judgment, the Campbells are still
entitled to recover for their emotional distress and other damages
caused by State Farm's earlier wrongful conduct.
State Farm's motion, and the district court's ruling, were
premised on the erroneous idea that a plaintiff alleging bad faith
refusal to settle does not suffer any damages until the judgment is
executed upon or until the cause of action accrues. Under State
Farm's logic, the general damages incurred by an automobile
accident victim prior to reaching the $3,000 special damages
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threshold under Utah no-fault law would not be compensable in a
subsequent action. Similarly, damages would not be recoverable in
a wrongful prosecution action for conduct occurring prior to the
termination of criminal proceedings, when the cause of action
accrues. State Farm's argument is insupportable under the law.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed this precise issue
in Larraburu Brothers, Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Company, 604 F.2d
1208 (9th Cir. 1979) . Noting that the issue was of first
impression, the court addressed the question of
whether an insurance company satisfies that duty [to
settle] if it pays the full amount of a verdict against
the insured, including the amount in excess of the policy
limits, before the judgment against the insured becomes
final, where the earlier failure to settle within policy
limits injures the insured's credit standing, results in
economic injury by causing the insured to enter
bankruptcy, and produces other consequential damage.
I_d. at 1210.
In Larraburu, the insurer refused to settle within policy
limits, and an excess verdict was entered. The insureds alleged
that their business was ruined by the reaction of creditors to the
excess verdict, and that they suffered emotional distress. For
purposes of the appeal, the court assumed the insureds could "prove
they sustained consequential damages proximately caused by [the
insurer's] conduct...." Id. at 1211.
As in this case, the insurers in Larraburu attempted to
forestall a bad faith claim by paying the excess judgment before
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the judgment became final and executable. The plaintiffs filed a
bad faith claim seeking damages incurred by the insurer's bad faith
refusal to settle, including emotional distress, economic loss, and
punitive damages. The insurance company moved to dismiss the bad
faith case, claiming that payment of the excess judgment before it
became final on appeal cured or prevented any breach of its duty to
settle. The insurer took the same position advanced by State Farm
in this case, arguing:
Whether or not bad faith ever occurs is determined by the
existence of an excess judgment ... If the insurer pays
the judgment before it becomes final, bad faith conduct
never occurs .... It is only the failure to pay the
excess judgment after it becomes final which gives rise
to a right of action against the insurer. By paying the
excess verdict. Royal acted in good faith and cannot now
be sued.
Id. at 1212.
In support of its argument, the insurance company cited cases
holding that a cause of action for bad faith does not accrue until
an excess judgment is final. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument, noting:
What for us is the controlling conception of this tort
can be stated simply: It is the unreasonable failure to
settle the claim, not simply the failure to pay all of
the ultimate judgment, which is the breach of the
insurer's duty and causes injury. The insurer's conduct
at the time a reasonable settlement could have been
effected determines whether the insurer has breached its
duty to the insured, and not, on the other hand, whether
the insurer pays the excess before a final judgment is
entered.
17
Id. at 1214 (emphasis added).
The court further observed that even though a cause of action
for bad faith technically does not accrue until entry of a final
judgment, it "does not alter the fact that the conduct alleged to
be unreasonable occurred at an earlier stage of the original
lawsuit, and that the unreasonable conduct can be a proximate cause
of injury before the final disposition as well as after." Id. at
1215.
As in Larraburu, the Campbells allege that they suffered
emotional distress, physical injury, economic loss, and other
consequential damages as a result of State Farm's unreasonable
failure to settle. The Campbells also allege that State Farm's
conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages. While State
Farm may dispute the Campbells' allegations, plainly an issue of
material fact exists which precluded summary judgment.
While the issue raised in the Campbells' appeal has not been
directly addressed by this Court, the decision in Ammerman v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange. 22 Utah 2d 187, 450 P.2d 460 (1959),
supports the Campbells' position. In that case, this Court joined
the majority of jurisdictions holding that payment of an excess
judgment by the insured is not a prerequisite to a bad faith action
against an insurer. One of the reasons cited by the Court was the
recognition that "the fact of entry of the judgment itself against
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the insured constitutes a real damage to him..." Id. at 462. This
Court has thus already recognized that an insured may incur damages
or injury apart from the excess judgment itself.
The Campbells testified below that they did suffer such
damages. Within a few hours after the trial ended, the Campbells
were told by their attorney that they should put a "For-Sale sign"
on their house. The Campbells subsequently made a list of all
their assets which might be taken to satisfy the judgment. News of
the verdict spread throughout the community, including the local
State Farm office, which posted a newspaper account of the verdict
as an inducement for customers to purchase higher policy limits.
(Depo. of Inez Campbell, p. 36). Mr. Campbell felt a change in his
relationship with social and business acquaintances, and he and his
wife experienced anxiety and depression. The Campbells incurred
personal attorney fees in an effort to prevent execution on their
personal assets. Both Campbells suffered health problems that were
aggravated by the stress from this situation.
Most of the above damages occurred soon after the trial, long
before the covenant not to sue was executed (or even mentioned) ,
and long before State Farm offered to pay the excess judgment in
exchange for a release of the Campbells' claims against it. In
light of those facts, State Farm's contention that the Campbells
suffered no damage seems incomprehensible. State Farm simply
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overlooks the fact that an insurance company's liability for
unreasonable failure to settle is not limited to the amount of the
excess judgment. Claims for bad faith refusal to settle sound in
tort, Ammerman, and thus the Campbells' remedies are not limited to
payment of the excess judgment. Plaintiffs can also recover for
economic loss, emotional distress, and punitive damages.
Larraburu, supra, 604 F.2d at 1213. See also. Beck v. Fire
Insurance Exchange. 701 P. 2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that
damages for emotional stress are recoverable, even in a first-party
contact claim); Gibson v. Western Fire Insurance Co. , 682 P.2d
725, 738 (Mont. 1984) (recovery for bad faith failure to settle
includes damages for depression, anxiety, loss of enthusiasm, and
embarrassment).
The fact that an insurer eventually pays the excess judgment
only means that one element of damages — the amount of the excess
judgment —- has been eliminated. It does not negate or compensate
for a plaintiff's other damages. The district court erred in
dismissing the Campbells' bad faith claims solely because the
excess judgment had been paid.
II- SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER IN LIGHT OF THE
CAMPBELLS' OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION.
In the Court below, the Campbells asserted claims for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
20
fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (R. 3-11). The district court's ruling
granting summary judgment on the entire complaint improperly
rejected the viability of these other claims.
Under Utah law, there are two separate causes of action in bad
faith which would apply to this case: (1) An implied contractual
duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) the tort of bad faith
in a third party claim situation, such as this one. Beck, 701 P.2d
at 799-800. There were extensive facts alleged (and
uncontroverted) below supporting the extreme breach of both of
these duties, as described in the affidavits of State Farm's
adjuster and plaintiffs' expert, as well as the other general facts
relating to this case. This is clearly a case where the insurer
gambled its insured's financial security with a questionable chance
of succeeding in its position. In any event, those were issues of
fact which precluded summary judgment.
The Campbells also pled a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty. It has long been recognized in Utah that in the
context of third-party claims, a fiduciary relationship is created
between the insurer and insured. "The covenant in the policy
requiring the insurer to defend the insured imposes upon it a
fiduciary responsibility. . . . [T]he company cannot properly
gamble with or sacrifice the insured's interest simply to protect
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itself." Ammerman, 430 P.2d at 578-79. More recently, this court
noted the difference between a first-party and third-party
situation:
In essence, the contract itself creates a fiduciary
relationship because of the trust and reliance placed in
the insurer by its insured. The insured is wholly
dependent upon the insurer to see that, in dealing with
claims by third parties, the insured's best interests are
protected. In addition, when dealing with third parties,
the insurer acts as an agent for the insured with respect
to the disputed claim. Wholly apart from the contractual
obligations undertaken by the parties, the law imposes
upon all agents a fiduciary obligation to their
principals with respect to matters falling within the
scope of their agency.
Beck, 701 P.2d at 799-800 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This Court has described in more detail the nature of a
fiduciary relationship:
A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar
confidence placed by one individual in another. A
fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for
the benefit of another. . . . Generally, in a fiduciary
relationship, the property, interest or authority of the
other is placed in the charge of the fiduciary.
First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Development Corp. , 786 P. 2d
1326, 1333 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted).
Under the facts of this case, particularly as described in the
sworn testimony of State Farm's adjuster, a jury could certainly
conclude that State Farm breached its fiduciary duty to the
Campbells. The Campbells are therefore entitled to recover for all
damages as a result of said breach.
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An additional cause of action asserted by the Campbells was
for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. Because of its
fiduciary relationship with the insured, State Farm owed a duty to
the Campbells to disclose all relevant information relating to the
evaluation of liability and personal risk. Not only did State Farm
fail to do so, but it intentionally and expressly represented to
Curtis Campbell that he faced no personal exposure and that the
adverse evidence, if any, was of no import. State Farm did this
despite its own adjuster's evaluation of likely excess exposure.
The Campbells knew nothing about the significant adverse evidence
and about their risk of exposure, nor did they have experience or
expertise to assist them in evaluating the risk. They specifically
relied upon State Farm because of its expertise in this area.
Again, there was sufficient evidence to create issues of fact under
this cause of action.
Plaintiffs next asserted a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Based upon the affidavits of Ray
Summers and Milton Beck, and viewing the facts most favorably to
the Campbells, a jury could have found the actions of State Farm
outrageous. It was clear to any reasonable adjuster that exposing
an insured to a large excess judgment would cause extreme mental
distress and adverse financial consequences, which in fact
occurred. Thus, there were sufficient issues of fact to prevent
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summary judgment on this cause of action. Samms v. Eccles. 11 Utah
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
Viewing the facts most favorably to the Campbells, recovery
under any of the above theories would have included damages for
emotional injury and punitive damages. An award of punitive
damages is proper when the defendant's conduct was willful and
malicious, or in reckless disregard of the rights of others.
Gleave v. Denver Rio Grande Western Railroad, 749 P.2d 660, 67 0
(Utah App. 1988). Punitive damages are based upon the nature of
the wrongdoer's acts, the circumstances surrounding the wrongful
acts, the relative wealth of the wrongdoer, the probability the
wrongdoer might act in the same way in the future, the relationship
between the parties and the effect of the misconduct in the lives
of the victims and others. Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 771
(Utah 1985). There is evidence to support each of those elements
as a basis for an award of punitive damages in this case.
There is significant evidence of State Farm's indifference to
the financial security of the Campbells, which had an extreme
effect upon the Campbells' lives. It refused to acknowledge
Campbell's personal exposure and disclose the same to him. This
was a reckless indifference for Campbell's rights, in light of:
1. All of the eyewitnesses (except Campbell's wife)
implicated Campbell as a precipitating cause of the
accident;
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2. Plaintiffs' experts attributed all of the fault to
Campbell;
3. Under the law of joint and several liability (which
applied at that time), Campbell could be liable for 100%
of the damages, even though only minimally at fault;
4. The claimed damages included serious personal injuries
with medical expenses in excess of $20,000, and a death,
which damages likely exceed the policy limits; and
5. State Farm's own adjuster believed there was excess
exposure. (R. 286-90 and exhibits; R. 464-72.)
According to the uncontroverted testimony of its own adjuster,
State Farm had been taking the same calloused attitude toward other
insureds. (R.288, Para. 5). The Campbells had no experience in
evaluating claims and were of modest means. State Farm had
extensive experience in investigating, evaluating and litigating
claims and has substantial resources available. Even if the
Campbells' damages were insignificant, as asserted by State Farm,
this is no legal basis to dismiss a claim for punitive damages
under the circumstances of this case. Material issues of fact are
prevalent and summary judgment should have been denied.
The district court apparently concluded, however, that in no
event could the Campbells recover against State Farm. The court
accepted State Farm's argument that permitting the Campbells to
pursue their claims would "open the floodgates" and allow insureds
to sue every time they are involved in a trial, regardless of
whether an excess judgment was entered. (R. 573).
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The district court's rationale overlooks two basic facts,
however. First, an excess judgment was entered against the
Campbells. This Court has recognized that entry of such a judgment
in itself causes harm, even if the insured does not have to pay it.
Ammerman. Second, it ignores the fact that one of the benefits
bargained for with a liability insurance policy is that the insured
will not be exposed unreasonably to the trauma of litigation,
including an excess judgment. If, after hearing all the evidence,
a jury determines that failure to settle was reasonable, an
insurance company is protected. If the insurer is unreasonable or
acts in bad faith, resulting in an excess judgment, however, the
insurance company should be liable to its insureds for all their
damages. The district court's ruling was erroneous and should be
overturned.
Ill- SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE
CAMPBELLS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY PERFORM DISCOVERY.
Even though State Farm's motion was brought more than a year
after the Campbells' action was filed, the Campbells had not yet
completed all of their discovery. There were delays in obtaining
requested documents from State Farm, and State Farm objected to
providing many of the documents and information requested by the
Campbells (which apparently would require court assistance to
resolve). State Farm also resisted the taking of the deposition of
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Ray Summers, claiming the deposition was irrelevant for purposes of
its summary judgment motion. (R. 474).
In May 1990, the attorney for the Campbells had extensive
surgery on his right leg which resulted in complications, including
manipulation under general anesthetic in June and additional
surgery in September, 1990. (R. 221-22). While State Farm's
counsel was accommodating during the disability of the Campbells'
attorney, nevertheless, the plaintiffs were unable to finalize
their discovery.
U.R.Civ.P. 56(f) provides:
When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance
to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order
as is just.
As the rule recognizes, summary judgment should be denied if
discovery is incomplete, since information sought in discovery may
create genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat the motion.
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987).
"Such a [Rule 56(f)] request should be liberally treated, unless
dilatory or lacking in merit." Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical,
Inc. , 764 P. 2d 636, 639 (Utah App. 1988) . The affidavit of
plaintiffs' counsel set forth the reasons why discovery was
incomplete, and explained that many of the facts supporting
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plaintiffs' causes of action would be obtained by deposition of the
State Farm adjuster and supervisors. (R. 221-22, Paras. 4-5).
Consequently, the district court abused its discretion in
denying the Campbells' request for a continuance of the hearing on
the summary judgment motion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully
request the Court to reverse the district court's order granting
summary judgment, and to remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this / -' day of June, 1991.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
<• "'L. 'Rich Humpherys
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Defendant's Motion for Sum-nary Judgment was heard on the
31st day of December, 1990. Defendant was represented by Glenn
C. Hanni. Plaintiffs were represented by L. Rich Humpherys.
The Court read the Memoranda filed by counsel, heard oral
argument, and took the matter under advisement. The Court
orally advised counsel of its ruling and stated that a
Memorandum Decision would be forthcoming.
This case arose as a result of plaintiff Curtis Campbell
being involved in an automobile accident wherein a Mr. Slusher
suffered personal injuries and Mr. Ospital was killed.
Slusher and Ospital's personal representative alleged that
Mr. Curtis, who was insured by defendant, was at faulr.
.J : -)
CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant undertook the defense of its insured. During the
pendency of the action, the injured parties offered to settle
for the policy limits, but defendant refused.
The cases were tried and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the claimants in excess of $250,000.00. Defendants
filed an appeal in behalf of Curtis Campbell, but the Judgment
was sustained by the Utah Supreme Court.
Two years after the Judgment was entered and while the case
was on appeal, defendant offered to pay the excess Judgment,
provided that Mr. Campbell release the defendant from any and
all claims that Mr. and Mrs. Campbell may have against
defendant. The defendant subsequently offered to pay the
entire Judgment without any conditions.
The issue presented to the Court for decision is: Whether
or not a cause of action exists in favor of an insured against
his insurer when the insurer promises to pay an excess judgment
in full if and when the judgment becomes final, and after the
judgment becomes final, the insurer then immediately satisfies
the entire judgment.
In reviewing plaintiffs' Complaint, this cause of action is
founded upon their claim that they suffered severe physical and
emotional problems which were caused or aggravated by
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defendant's representation of them in the Slusher and Ospital
lawsuits.
Evidently the defendant did not keep Mr. Campbell fully
advised of his potential liability and the consequences of an
excess judgment. The thought of his property being subject to
execution, no doubt, could have caused him and his wife
emotional and mental problems. However, the Court does not
believe that Mr. Campbell was so naive that he did not
understand or realize that the jury could find him responsible
for the accident.
Despite Mr. Campbell's complaints about the manner in which
defendant prosecuted his defense, he shares some of the
responsibility in the decision making process. He was adamant
in his belief that he was not at fault. Defendant had an
obligation to give some deference to Mr. Campbell's version of
what occurred. In view of Mr. Campbell' s anticipated testirr.ony
at trial, it would not be unreasonable for defendant not to
settle the claims, even after the trial Mr. Campbell was upset
because the jury did not believe him.
The Court believes that the following language taken from
pages 22 and 23 of defendant's Reply Memorandum aptly states
the Court's view in this case:
*r' {>:':':
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If plaintiffs' theory with respect to the
viability of other causes of action were
accepted, there would be nothing to prevent an
insured from claiming emotional distress,
sleepless nights, attorney's fees, punitive
damages, breach of fiduciary duties, and failure
of the insurance company to keep the insured
fully informed even if the lawsuit against the
insured went to trial and judgment was rendered
against the insured for less than policy limits.
If the Campbells' theory about alternative causes
of action were accepted, all insureds could
demand that their insurers settle every case. If
the insurers refused, the insureds could argue
that by failing to settle and subjecting them to
a trial, the insurer caused them a lot of
emotional distress and suffering for which they
should be compensated. Obviously, the law does
not work that way. The reason is clear. The
duty of an insurance company as to its insured is
spelled out in the insurance policy. It has a
duty to defend the insured and to pay damages
which may be assessed against the insured up to
the limit of its insurance policy. What gives
rise to a damage claim by the insured against the
insurer is an excess judgment which the insurer
refuses to pay.
Just like no cause of action exists to
allow an insured to recover compensatory or
punitive damages from his insurer as a result of
a very stressful trial where judgment is
ultimately entered against the insured for less
than policy limits, so too does no cause of
action exist when an excess judgment is entered
which the insurer pays in full. The rationale in
each case is the same. Trials are stressful.
Litigation is emotionally charged. However, it
would be disastrous precedent for any court to
adopt plaintiffs' argument. Were a court to do
so, the floodgates would open and insureds would
then sue insurers on all kinds of legal theories
even if a third party did not recover an excess
judgment against the insured.
,> «• j
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The Court concludes that the better reasoned cases are
those that hold that the insured has no cause of action against
his insurer prior to an excess judgment becoming final and
binding upon an insured. The cause of action can only arise,
if at all, when the insured incurs a binding and enforceable
judgment against the insured in excess of his policy limits.
National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. 0'Daniel.
329 P.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964).
The Court refers the parties to defendant's Memorandum for
additional reasons for its decision.
Defendant's counsel shall prepare the Judgment accordingly.
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Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Honorable John A. Rokich
The motion of defendant for summary judgment came on for
hearing before the Honorable John A. Rokich on December 10, 1990.
Plaintiffs were represented by their attorney, L. Rich Humpherys
of the firm of Christensen, Jensen & Powell. Defendant was
represented by its attorneys, Glenn C. Hanni and Robert A. Burton
of the firm of Strong & Hanni. The court having considered the
briefs filed by the parties, the records and files of the above
case, and having heard oral argument of counsel, and having written
a memorandum decision, and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. Defendant's motion for summarv iudament is hereby
</*
granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant and
against plaintiff, no cause of action.
2. The motion for summary judgment is granted on the
grounds and for the reasons stated in the court's memorandum
decision and urged in defendant's briefs filed in support of
the motion.
Dated this / 1 day of February, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
.I 'l--i^ H K •*
rroiiorable John A. Rb/Kich, Judge
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W. Scott Bsrrett
Barrett & Dames
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